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‘πόλεμος βίαιος διδάσκαλος’ 
   Thucydides.
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August 1914 turned the natural order in the historical profession upside down. Before then 
historians had sometimes taken an interest in war; now war took an interest in their scholarship. 
Until August 1914, most historians went about their business scarcely more aware of the British 
state than the average Edwardian citizen. They had been raised on a diet of constitutional 
history and churchmanship; and although there was an obvious political dimension to such 
matters, the state, especially also in its external aspects, was a distant entity, just as Britain was 
'top nation' as if divinely so ordained.2 After the lights went out all over Europe, historians 
found themselves in much closer proximity to the state than they might have thought possible, 
or indeed desirable, before 1914. A number of them, if not actually fighting at the front, were 
drafted into government propaganda departments or the various intelligence agencies that 
mushroomed as the war progressed. In 1923, after the glad confident Paris morning of liberal 
internationalism had given way to a gloomier, colder day, two of them commented on their and 
their colleagues' war-time endeavours with becoming self-deprecation. Their memoranda and 
other planning documents, they concluded, had made little impact except, perhaps, on 
ministerial wastepaper baskets: 'For M. Clemenceau history began in 1871, Mr. Lloyd George 
knew little history, and President Wilson ... expressed a hope that no reference would be made 
to the designs of the statesmen of Vienna [in 1815].'3 
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 Thucydides, Istorion A, ed. E.C. Marchant (London, 1964), bk. III, c. 82: ‘War is a rough teacher’. 
 
2.See the pertinent comments by H.W.C. Davis (revised R.H.C. Davis and R. Hunt), A History of Balliol College 
(Oxford, 1963), 241. It remains a curious fact that Bishop Stubbs' emphasis on the connection between external 
pressure - the Hundred Years' War - and the growth of Parliament went largely unremarked at the time, see W. 
Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origins and Development (3 vols., Oxford, 1878) III, 57-8 and 
73-4. 
3.H.W.V. Temperley and C.K. Webster, 'The Congress of Vienna, 1814-15, and the Conference of Paris, 1919', 
W.N. Medlicott (ed.), From Metternich to Hitler: Aspects of British and Foreign History, 1814-1939 (London, 
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 That they were too modest about their achievements to be strictly accurate has been 
shown by recent scholarship. Whilst the role of historians prior to and during the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 and the degree to which they succeeded - or failed - to shape decision-
making have been examined in considerable depth and detail, the reverse of the coin has been 
given but the most cursory of glances. And yet the effect of the war on historical scholarship 
was profound. Not the least, it stimulated the final emergence of diplomatic history as a distinct 
field of academic research, led by scholars who had served in wartime intelligence. This 
interplay between academia and officialdom, the complex and reciprocal relationship between 
dons working for government and the effect of that experience on their scholarly pursuit after 
the war is the subject of what follows. Given the nature of this collection of essays, the focus 
will be largely on international historians and scholars of the nascent international relations 
discipline.4 
 
*** 
Britain went to war unprepared for what lay ahead. For British academia, especially scholars in 
the humanities, the war was a profound shock. For a generation or two, Germany – the 
Germany of Jena and Göttingen, of Heidelberg and Tübingen rather than the Potsdam parade 
ground – had been a beacon of excellence for the liberal intelligentsia. Many of them had made 
the obligatory pilgrimage to seats of learning in Germany, had taken a deep draught of 
Wagner’s heady brew, and followed German scholarship ever after.5 Now notions of Prussian 
militarism and German war-guilt seeped into historical and political consciousness. Historians, 
too, rallied to the flag. Drilled in close textual exegesis in Select Charters and Letters and 
Papers, Foreign and Domestic, and committed to 'scientific' methods and the idea of strict 
impartiality, they might not have been predestined for such a role. Few of them had any real 
                     
4.For a discussion of classicists, see C. Stray, 'From odium to bellum: Classical Scholars at War in Europe and 
America, 1800-1924', Classical Receptions Journal X, 4 (2018), 356-75. 
5.Illustrative the reflections of Sir J. Marriott, Memories of Four Score Years (London, 1946), 143-45. 
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grasp of recent, let alone contemporary, history. It was, the President of the Royal Historical 
Society had noted ten years earlier, 'as if we regarded the year 1815 as bringing a great historical 
epoch to a close, but not as being the commencement of a new and equally important period.'6 
 The summer of 1914 shattered any such illusions of the nirvana of a never-ending 
present. Whatever their scholarly scruples or their remoteness from current affairs, historians 
took to writing about the conflict now unfolding on the continent. Indeed, the war reinforced a 
conviction that history somehow mattered, that insights derived from its study had vital 
practical significance. A.F. Pollard, Professor of Constitutional History at University College 
London and editor of History, articulated this rediscovered sense of mission in the inaugural 
issue of that journal. It was to bring 'the light of history to bear on the study of politics', and to 
help to judge 'modern experiment by historical experience.'7  
 Between 1914 and 1919 that light was shone through 'war histories', mostly in the shape 
of propaganda pamphlets, and through employment in Whitehall. These two branches of 
activity were entwined, and some historians contributed to both. As for propaganda, one prolific 
pamphleteer, F.J.C. Hearnshaw of King's College London, reflected after the war with a degree 
of contrition that it had been misguided and largely unsuccessful, and that '[t]o treat of it would 
be a painful and almost indecent task.'8 More recent generations of historians, unencumbered by 
such delicacy and gifted with a higher toleration of pain, have found in these literary 
productions a rich seam of material that helps to elucidate the shifting attitudes towards the 
                     
6.G.W. Prothero, 'Presidential Address', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society XVIII (1904), 12. Prothero 
had taken the trouble to discover whether recent history was taught in continental universities. It was!, see replies by 
Pflugk-Hartung, 27 Jan., Boutmy, 29 Jan., and Fournier, 5 Feb. 1904, Prothero MSS, Royal Historical Society, 
PP2/III/4. 
7.[A.F. Pollard], 'Editorial', History I, 1 (1916), 3. His Thomas Cranmer and the English Reformation, 1489-1556 
(London, 1905) and The Evolution of Parliament (London, 1920) reflected the Whiggish constitutional and 
ecclesiastical predilections of the day. 
8.F.J.C. Hearnshaw, 'History as a Means of Propaganda', Fortnightly Review, n.s. CXIV (1 Aug. 1923), 330. His 
Service to the State: Six Essays on Matters concerning Britain's Safety and Good Government (London, 1916) 
gives a flavour of his writing. He later overcame the reservations expressed in the 1920s and returned to the charge 
with Germany: Aggressor through the Ages (Edinburgh, 1940). 
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enemy powers and Britain's role in Europe. The most effective general statement of Britain's 
case, the case of liberal Edwardian England, against Germany and the Central Powers was made 
in Why We Are at War. Written by half-a-dozen Oxford historians and rushed into print by 
Clarendon Press in mid-September 1914, it went through seven imprints and two revisions 
before the middle of the following month and received wider dissemination still following its 
translation into several foreign languages. Some 120 pages long but with an even longer 
appendix, consisting of official documents published by the belligerent powers, the book 
inaugurated a series of further Oxford Pamphlets, and it set the tone of this type of literature.9 It 
was the intention of the Oxford Six 'to set forth the causes of the present war, and the principles 
which we believe to be at stake.' For this task they had 'some experience in the handling of 
historic [sic] evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat the subject historically.' Indeed, 
weaned on the set texts of the literae humaniores or reared on Stubb's Charters if they were 
history graduates, the work was remarkable for its heavy reliance on the so-called 'colour 
books', collections of official documents published by the belligerent governments to justify 
their positions. Britain's commitment to France was accepted as axiomatic. In taking up arms to 
defend Belgium, meanwhile, 'we fight for the law of nations; that is, ultimately, for the peace of 
all nations and for the right of the weaker to exist.' More difficult to treat was the role of Russia, 
the war-time alliance with whom sat uneasily with pre-war sensibilities. Since 1890, the six 
Oxford historians averred, Russia had acted 'in close accord with the desires of national 
[Balkan] Slav sentiment.' They thus insinuated the essentially progressive character of Russian 
policy, a circumstance further underlined by the Tsar's apparent promise to re-establish an 
autonomous Poland after the war. Indeed, the post-1905 'new constitutional Russia of the Duma 
is Anglophil' and 'the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only coincided ... with the 
                     
9.E. Barker, L.G. Wickham Legge, H.W.C. Davis, C.R.L. Fletcher, A. Hassall and F. Morgan, Why We Are at War: 
Great Britain's Case (Oxford, 3rd ed. 1914). Translations were brought out at the same time, see e.g. Warum Wir 
Krieg Führen: Grossbritanniens Rechtsstandpunkt (Oxford, 1914) [note the emphasis on law in the title] and 
Grundene til Englands Deltagelse i Krigen (Oxford, 1914). Admirably unrestrained is the analysis offered by S. 
Wallace, War and the Image of Germany: British Academia, 1914-1918 (Edinburgh, 1988), 58-73 et passim.  
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Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed much to the inspiration of England.' And although 
Russia was the first great power to mobilise in 1914, 'she took the step in consequence of 
German threats.'10  
 There was considerable variation amongst the 'war histories' that followed where Why 
We Are at War had led. Not all of them strove to strike the same judicious tone. The book 
nevertheless established the broad parameters of public discourse on the war. Britain had to 
defend France and the smaller nations of Europe, whose rights had to be safeguarded. Russia 
was acknowledged, albeit often warily, as a civilised, quasi-Western power, whereas Germany 
had sloughed off the veneer of civilisation, and her innate militarism was identified as one of 
the root causes of the war. German belligerence, indeed, was treated as the outward 
manifestation of German philosophy. To that extent, observed one of its authors, H.W.C. 
Davis11, 'German political theory [was] a deeper cause of the European war.'12 The notion had 
taken hold of 'Harry' Davis, one of the foremost mediaevalists of the day. He interrupted his 
work editing Anglo-Norman charters and by the end of 1914 had produced a study on the 
political views of Heinrich von Treitschke, the principal exponent of ultra-nationalism amongst 
the German historical profession. Before the war, Treitschke, who had died in 1896, was 
respected for his scholarship. But his British colleagues had viewed his writings on political 
matters with the bemused aloofness of an amateur botanist observing the antics of some exotic 
beetle. '[A]n historian, however great, is not always a safe guide in politics', one of them had 
concluded in 1904.13 The war changed that; and, together with Friedrich Nietzsche and 
                     
10. Why We Are at War, 5, 14-5, 52, 56, and 79. 
11.Henry William Carless Davis (1879-1928), ed. Weymouth, Balliol College; Fellow, All Souls, 1897-1902; 
Fellow, Balliol, 1902-21; vice-chairman War Trade Intelligence Department, 1915-19; acting Director, Department 
of Overseas Trade, 1919; Professor of History, Manchester, 1921-4; Regius Professor, Oxford, 1924-8; Fellow, 
Oriel, 1924-8. 
12.Davis to Tout, 27 Sept. [1914], as quoted in M. Bentley, Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography 
in the Age of Modernism, 1870-1970 (Cambridge, 2006), 83. 
13.Prothero, 'Presidential Address', 8. 
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Friedrich von Bernhardi, Treitschke became part of an unholy trinity, much referenced by 
British war-time pamphlets. The 'political philosophy which is now in vogue in Germany', 
wrote Davis, had been fertilised by his ideas. His study of Treitschke's Politik was an exercise in 
careful textual exegesis, and it was remarkable for eschewing any polemical asides against this 
super-Prussian from Saxony. In almost Rankean tones Davis explained that he had sought not to 
criticise but merely 'to explain how the thought of Treitschke was influenced by events of his 
own life time', and how and why his polemics 'referred directly or indirectly to current questions 
of German politics.'14   
 While Davis had refrained from polemics, younger scholars were less inhibited. One of 
them was his fellow-Balliol historian Arnold J. Toynbee15, whose Nationality and the War was 
avowedly political. A trained classicist, already as an undergraduate Toynbee had developed an 
interest in international politics, and more especially the affairs of the Near East and the 
Balkans.16 To his mind the war was the outcome of 'national questions'. Indeed, 'the riddle of 
Nationality [had] become an affair of life and death.' The book showed traces of Toynbee's later 
penchant for the epigrammatic: '[t]he living generation of Germans is suffering for a thousand 
years of history.' But in content and diction it was very much the product of Liberal, upper-class 
Edwardian England, combining concern for the principle of nationality, albeit not 
unadulterated, with a sublime confidence in the beneficent, for enlightened, force of the British 
Empire. Its five hundred-odd pages were an early indication of Toynbee's ability rapidly to 
                     
14.H.W.C. Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke (London, 1914), iii. Among Davis pre-war 
works are Charlemagne (London, 1900), England under the Normans and Angevins, 1066-1272 (London, 1905) 
and (ed., with R.J. Whitwell), Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum, 1066-1154, I, Regesta Willelmi Conquestoris 
et Willelmi Rufi (Oxford, 1913). 
15.Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975), ed. Balliol, 1907-11; Fellow of Balliol, 1912-15; Propaganda Bureau, 
1915-18; Political Intelligence Department, 1918-9; Koraes Professor of Modern Greek and Byzantine history, 
King’s College, London, 1919-24; Literary Director, Chatham House, and Stevenson Research Professor, London 
School of Economics, 1924-54. 
16.W.J. McNeill, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life (New York and Oxford, 1989), 41-8; and also Toynbee's own 
recollections, id., Acquaintances (London, 1967), 50. His scholarly output was still limited at that stage, 'The 
Growth of Sparta', Journal of Hellenic Studies xxxiii, 2 (1913), 246-75. 
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absorb vast amounts of material to produce a substantive piece of analysis. Three central strands 
of Toynbee's argument are worth noting. Berlin's decision to plunge Europe into war had been 
'an immense mistake', but the 'only way to convince Germany [that peace was preferable] is to 
beat her badly and then to treat her well.' This meant allowing her 'to retain all openings for 
peaceable ... expansion afforded her by her [pre-war] oversea dominions.' The future of Alsace-
Lorraine and Schleswig-Holstein had to be settled on basis of nationality and by means of 
plebiscites, while Germany herself ought to be reconstituted as 'a truly federal Empire' to break 
Prussia's hegemony over the country: 'Spare Germany by all means, but humiliate Prussia 
without restraint.'17  
 As for Germany's ally, Toynbee stressed the 'extraordinary vitality' of the Habsburg 
Empire in defiance of nationality, but it could no longer be preserved. Territory would have to 
be ceded to Italy and Romania in deference to the nationality principle. But it was the 'secession 
of the Southern Slavs [that would] dislocate the structure of the Danubian Monarchy.' To 
achieve longer-term stability in the region Toynbee suggested a 'Balkan Zollverein', including 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania and the Southern Slavs. The Balkans had been 'a 
no-man's land', a power vacuum that had tempted the great powers 'to tear each other to pieces 
for the proprietorship of a wilderness.' In such a wilderness no peace could be made. An 
economic federation, however, ' will almost automatically develop into a defensive alliance.'18  
 The corollary to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was some form of Anschluss with a 
reconstituted, federal Germany. 1866 and 1814 would be wiped out. It also meant that the 
German population of Bohemia and Moravia 'cannot be abandoned to Tchech [sic] nationalism, 
enjoying power for the first time, and schooled, as a victim, in Austrian methods of using it.' 
Toynbee's analysis of the Czech problem was driven by the twin-insight that '[o]n the old 
political scale, Geography decreed that the Tchechs should be a nation; on the new economic 
                     
17.A.J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London, 1915), v, 21, 29, 36, 40-7, and 81. Toynbee expressly thanked 
H.W.C. Davis for his support in compiling the book, ibid., x. 
18.Ibid., 102, 137, 216, 242, 243-4. Toynbee also discussed at length the dismantling of Turkey, ibid., 379-448. 
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scale it has brigaded them inexorably with the German group.' The answer, then, was for all of 
rump-Austria to join Germany 'as a single unit, on condition that she grants Home Rule within 
this district [Bohemia and Moravia] to the whole Tchech nationality.' A new Germany, 
reconstituted along federal lines, and with the nationality principle used fairly as much to her 
advantage as to her detriment, was an indispensable part of any lasting post-war settlement. It 
was this that a future peace conference had to attempt, rather 'like the Vienna Congress a 
century ago.'19 
 Toynbee's suggestions regarding an eventual peace settlement were by no means free 
from contradictions. While he wished for Germany to join the Allies in 'organising some 
international authority', he was vague on the nature of such a body. He stressed that 'we cannot 
simply deposit our document in some international "Ark of Covenant" and go our ways'; and 
that treaties were ‘lifeless’, unless administered by ‘a living organ with executive power, ... with 
sovereign authority.' And yet he did not envisage this international body to have such powers; it 
had 'scrupulously [to] confine itself to the adjustment of the equilibrium between individual 
units, and to the apportionment among them of untenanted areas.'20 Toynbee's idea of a post-
war international organisation thus hovered somewhat uneasily between the old Concert of 
Europe and some League of Nations-type body. He was adamant, however, that Europe was at a 
crossroads. If the nations now at war succeeded in using the current crisis 'to liberate their 
energies for higher ends', then Europe might yet thrive. If they failed, 'the Sovereign Nations of 
Europe are doomed to the same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of Greece.'21 Like so often 
in contemporary commentary, Toynbee's war-time opus was a mixture of prophecy and fallacy. 
At the distance of over a hundred years his prognosis of China's rise is remarkable: 'The 
fundamental factor of world-politics will be the competition between China and the new 
                     
19.Ibid., 247, 263, 264-5, 266-7 and 271-2. 
20.Ibid., 38, 489 and 494. 
21.Ibid., 500. 
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commonwealths' that would emerge 'to preserve the Pacific from Chinese domination.' The 
suggestion that Russia would be 'the chief promoter' of this combination, by contrast, seems less 
surefooted.22  
 Toynbee's concluding reference to ancient Greece is instructive, for as an historian of 
antiquity and as a student of current affairs Toynbee was influenced by the classicist A.E. 
Zimmern.23 A tutor at New College, then the fountain-head of Greek studies, Zimmern had 
taught the undergraduate Toynbee, who found his lectures 'immensely stimulating; and I had a 
warm affection and regard for him as a friend.'24 Zimmern was a Hellenist, who believed in the 
benefits of a historical education. Those trained in the discipline were not 'ready with quick 
remedies for present difficulties: for history supplies no rules for the solution of her problems. 
But she has in store ... a more precious gift - eyes to see and understand and unshaken courage 
to face and master them.'25 What made Zimmern's lectures remarkable was his ability to connect 
the Graeco-Roman world with the present, without resorting to crude over-simplifications.26 
The work for which he is best known, The Greek Commonwealth, was 'an attempt to make clear 
to myself what fifth-century Athens was really like.'27 Indeed, it was infused with contemporary 
                     
22.Ibid. 333-4. 
23.Alfred Eckhart Zimmern (1879-1957); ed. Winchester, New College, Oxford, Berlin; lecturer in ancient history, 
New College, 1903-4; fellow, New College, 1904-9; inspector with Board of Education, 1911-15; Political 
Intelligence Department, 1918-19; Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Relations, Aberystwyth University, 
1919-21; Acting Professor of Political Science, Cornell University, 1922-1923; Director, Geneva School of 
International Studies, 1925-1939; Deputy Director, League of Nations Institute for Intellectual Co-operation, Paris, 
1926-1930; Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, Oxford, 1930-1944; Deputy Director, Foreign 
Office Research Department, 1943-1945; Adviser, Information and External Affairs, Ministry of Education, 1945; 
Secretary-General, Constituent Conference, UNESCO, 1945. 
24.A.J. Toynbee, Experiences (London, 1969), 69; see also E.L. Woodward, Short Journey (London, s.a. [1942]), 
45-6.  
25.A.E. Zimmern, 'History as an Art', id., Solon and Croesus: And Other Greek Essays (London, 1928), 52-3. Most 
of the essays in this collection originated in Zimmern's Oxford lectures between 1905 and 1909, see 'Thucydides the 
Imperialist' (MS), lecture, Zimmern MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Zimmern 5. 
26.'The Study of Greek History', Solon and Croesus, 75: 'Greek civilization differs fundamentally from our own, 
both in its material environment and in its thoughts and feelings'. 
27.Id., The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (Oxford, 1911), 5. Note the 
Rankean echo. 
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liberal assumptions, clad in Hellenic garb. The polis of Periclean, pre-plague Athens was the 
ideal political community, ' the most successful example of social organisation known to 
history.' A liberal empire before it became the 'Robber Empire' of Cleon and Alcibiades the 
parallels with the British empire were obvious. Hellas enjoyed an 'era of material prosperity and 
spiritual advance, promoted by the armed peace of the Athenian Empire', whose central mission 
rested on two indispensable prerequisites: 'absolute security and adequate wealth.' For a 
'wonderful half-century', Zimmern enthused, 'the richest and happiest period in the recorded 
history of any single community ..., the perfect citizen in the perfect state.'28 This was the genius 
of the polis: 'it drew forth a deep patriotism from its citizens while at the same time ensuring 
that individuals continued to use their reason independently.'29  
 Although born and educated in Britain, Zimmern was doubly cosmopolitan. His family 
background was Anglo-continental - German-Jewish and Huguenot. A gifted linguist, he spoke 
several European languages fluently, and already during his time at New College he was deeply 
immersed in the affairs of South Eastern Europe. Zimmern 'could ... draw subtle distinctions, 
for he was sensitive and perceptive to an unusual degree.'30 The planned sequel on the Modern 
Commonwealth never materialised. Two world wars and his tendency to dissipate his energies 
conspired against it. An inspector with the Board of Education since 1912, he was involved in 
the workers' education movement and briefly taught at the London School of Economics. On 
the outbreak of the war, Zimmern joined with R.W. Seton-Watson31 and two others to produce 
                     
28.Ibid., 362, 362 n.1 and 426. Classicists were wont to draw parallels between the Peleponnesian War and that of 
194, e.g. G. Murray, 'Introduction', id. (ed.), Select Speeches from Thucydides: Selections from Jowett's Translation 
(Oxford, 1919), 6. For Murray's ordeal during the war, see F. West, Gilbert Murrary: A Life (London and Canberra, 
1984), 143-75. 
29.J. Morefield, '"An Education to Greece": The Round Table, Imperial Theory and the Uses of History', History of 
Political Thought XXVIII, 2 (2007), 350. 
30.Toynbee, Acquaintances, 52. In 1909, Zimmern lent Toynbee R.W. Seton-Watson's Racial Problems of 
Hungary (London, 1908), which turned Toynbee's interests towards international politics, ibid., 50. 
31.Robert William Seton-Watson (1879-1951), ed. Winchester, New College, Oxford, Berlin, Sorbonne, 
Vienna; Royal Army Medical Corps, 1915-7; Enemy Propaganda, 1917-8; Masaryk Professor in Central 
European History, 1922-45; Foreign Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939–1940; Political Intelligence 
Bureau, Foreign Office, 1940–1942. 
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'a guide to the study of the underlying causes and issues of the war.' The present was 'a testing 
time for Democracy', and the task before Europe was a double one - the practical one of 
restoring peace, and the intellectual one of creating 'true internationalism'.32 Zimmern, too, drew 
a sharp distinction between Prussia and 'real Germany', which was an 'integral part of the 
civilisation of Western Europe' and whose people were 'very similar to their neighbours of 
kindred stock'. But they had 'been indoctrinated and Prussianised not only into acquiescence, 
but into sympathy with the policy of its rulers.' The outlook of Prussia's ruling caste was alien to 
'Western habits of thought', but its 'domineering spirit' now shaped German foreign policy.33 
The war was thus 'a war of ideas.’ Germany had to be defeated, but Zimmern was wary of the 
nationality principle. Establishing a 'civil society' was more important than creating nation 
states, which always bore within them the seeds of oppression of minorities. This was Britain's 
historic task, for she was 'at once the freest, the largest, and the most vigorous' of the powers. 
There had never been 'a political organism like the British Empire. [...] Great Britain has thrown 
a girdle of law around the globe'; and the challenge now was 'to extend the sphere of Law.' Yet 
here, too, Zimmern was cautious. One road to a stable post-war order was the 'revival, on a 
firmer and broader foundation, of the Concert of Europe conceived by the Congress of Vienna'. 
 But this did not necessarily mean an international organisation with executive authority. 
Advocates of such schemes presupposed 'a world map definitely settled on lines satisfactory to 
the national aspirations of the peoples.' A parallel route of advance was through international 
education to foster amongst the nations now at war 'a sense of common duty and a common 
life.' This was 'the old slow high road of civilisation, not the short cut across the field.'34 
                     
32.R.W. Seton-Watson, J.D. Wilson, A.E. Zimmern and A. Greenwood, The War and Democracy (London, repr. 
1916 [1st Dec. 1914]), viii, 13-14. The book was dedicated to the Workers Education Association; for Zimmern’s 
work for the WEA, see L. Goldmann, Dons and Workers: Oxford and Adult Education since 1850 (Oxford, 1995), 
142-5. 
33.War and Democracy, 90-1, 94-5, 99 and 102. Intriguingly, Zimmern cited the German classicist Ulrich von 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in evidence. In 1912, Wilamowitz the leading light in Hellenic studies, had praised 
Zimmern's Greek Commonwealth W.M. Calder III, ‘Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff to Sir Alfred Zimmern 
on the Reality of Classical Athens’, Philologus CXXXIII, 1-2 (1989), 303-9. 
34.War and Democracy, 348, 350-1, 370-1, 374 and 379. Before the war Zimmern had a more positive attitude to 
Nietzsche, choosing one of his fellow-Hellenist's epigrams to open the first section of the Athenian study, id., Greek 
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*** 
Zimmern was much in demand as a public speaker as well as a frequent contributor to 
periodicals, such as Seton-Watson's The New Europe, or The Round Table, the empire-themed 
journal edited by Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis.35 He was a public intellectual, part of an 
emerging 'Labour intelligentsia'36, and he became a civil servant, spending part of the war in the 
Ministry of Reconstruction and then, in 1918-19, in the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence 
Department (PID). His quondam tutee Toynbee had likewise found his way into temporary 
officialdom, initially in the 'Mendacity Bureau', the government’s propaganda department.37 
 Already in early 1915, one of the Oxford Six, H.W.C. Davis, had joined the War Trade 
Intelligence Department (WTID). The organisation had gone through various iterations before 
emerging as the WTID by the summer of 1915, with its headquarters at Broadway House, 
Tothill Street, and superintended by T.H. (later Sir Henry) Penson and with Davis as its vice-
chairman. After the war Davis wrote an unofficial history of the department which, as part of 
the Ministry of Blockade, was linked to the Foreign Office. Its purpose was to sift trade-related 
reports with which Whitehall was inundated from all directions, gauge their value, collate and 
then disseminate the information thus gleaned. At the outbreak of war, it had been difficult 'to 
find any group of investigators with the leisure and the necessary qualifications for winnowing 
the mountains of chaff mixed with grain which passed under the name of trade intelligence.' 
                                                      
Commonwealth, 11. For Zimmern's scepticism about the nationality idea see also his lectures 'Nationality and 
Government', 'True and False Nationalism' and 'The Passing of Nationality', in id., Nationality and Government: 
With Other War-Time Essays (London, new ed. 1919), 32-60, 61-86, and 87-101. 
35.Some of his Round Table contributions were reprinted in Nationality and Government. For the background see 
H. and C. Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary 
(London, 1981), 178-80; and D. Lavin, 'History, Morals, and the Politics of Empire: Lionel Curtis and the Round 
Table', J. Bossy and P. Jupp (eds.), Essays Presented to Michael Roberts (Belfast, 1986), 117-32; and G. Studdert-
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This group formed 'a curious and interesting community', made up mostly of Oxford dons, 
barristers, stockbrokers and London literary types.38  
 The large number of intelligence officials with a historical education is striking but not 
surprising. For one thing, 'Greats' and the Modern History course still dominated the scene at 
Oxford, and at Cambridge the Historical Tripos was not far behind in influence, even its 
prestige did not match that of the Natural Sciences there. Graduates with some background in 
history were thus more common than pearls in oysters. For another, it was still generally 
accepted that a historical education equipped future civil servants and political leaders with the 
habits of mind necessary for dealing with the problems of imperial administration and strategic 
policy-making.39 That professional historians were drafted into war-time intelligence agencies 
was only to be expected then. Given their shared educational backgrounds, many of them were 
known, either by reputation or in person, to Whitehall mandarins. Trained, moreover, to 
contextualise and scrutinise documents, used to dealing with the often doubtful and fragmentary 
nature of extant evidence, and often possessing extensive linguistic skills and knowledge of 
foreign countries, they had the necessary attributes for intelligence work and policy advice. 
Since German was still the lingua franca of academia in the long nineteenth century, most of 
them spoke and read the language fluently; and not a few had spent some time studying at 
German universities. This applied, incidentally, more especially to Graecists, Latinists and 
papyrologists, many of whom found a niche in code-breaking, most notably Frank Adcock, 
F.M. Cornford and Dillwyn Knox.40 They came to Whitehall by different routes. Some, like 
Davis, Toynbee and Zimmern, volunteered for posts in government, once it became clear that 
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the belligerents had settled down to a war of attrition. Others had enlisted early in the war, to be 
redeployed in intelligence roles later, often on being deemed unfit for active service. 
 As the war ground on, these scholars-turned-civil servants proved their worth in 
cryptanalysis, trade intelligence and propaganda. But it also became clear that their expertise 
and skills could be used more effectively still. At some point the war was going to end; and, 
though no-one could yet know when and how it would be terminated, Britain had to be prepared 
for that eventuality. With this in mind Toynbee and Zimmern suggested, in January 1917, a 
scheme for a new intelligence section. Its specific remit was to 'to collect, organise, and present 
all the relevant facts' in a systematic manner, so as to create a sound basis of economic, 
ethnographic and political information regarding the territories likely to be affected by one or 
both groups of belligerents. It was an exercise in evidence-based decision-making: 'Whichever 
party is in possession of the most detailed knowledge regarding economic and political facts, 
the plans of the enemy, and the bearing of these facts upon their own, will have a formidable 
advantage over its opponents in making peace.'41 At the same time, a historian in military 
intelligence, H.W.V. Temperley42, pushed a similar scheme on a sympathetic Leo Amery, then 
a parliamentary private secretary in the Lloyd George coalition: 'Temperley came in with a 
suggestion that we should have a small historical staff to look into the past history of some of 
the debatable questions, more particularly the Balkans and Poland, which will come up at the 
Peace Conference.'43 There is no evidence that the three historians had coordinated their moves. 
Temperley had, at any rate, come to the view that a more strategic approach to war-time foreign 
                     
41.Memo. Toynbee and Zimmern, 'Peace-Terms Intelligence: Suggestions for a Peace Terms Intelligence Section to 
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policy was needed: ‘The political side of strategy requires a knowledge which cannot be 
improvised and is based on the study of history and a considerable acquaintance with 
contemporary politics, economics, and diplomacy.’44  
 In the course of 1917, separate developments converged to make the establishment of a 
political intelligence section possible. One was the incontrovertible need for more systemic 
evidence gathering and analysis. In Whitehall this might not have counted for much, had it not 
been for the fact that the Permanent Under-secretary of the Foreign Office, Lord Hardinge of 
Penshurst, fastened on such proposals in an effort to reverse his department's declining 
influence under David Lloyd George's imperial premiership. To restore the Foreign Office's pre-
war predominance over the policy-making process once hostilities had ended, Hardinge 
initiated a series of internal reforms. A consummate Whitehall warrior, he 'methodically 
acquired control of the planning machinery' that came into existence somewhat haphazardly in 
early 1917.45 Thus, the WTID was placed under the blockade ministry, an off-shoot of the 
Foreign Office and staffed by it, and a number of personnel, including Toynbee and Zimmern, 
were seconded from the Cabinet Office to the Foreign Office.  
 A key element of Hardinge's campaign of bureaucratic empire-building was the transfer 
of the Historical Section to his department. The section, also known as ID 27, was the 
brainchild of Admiral Reginald Hall, who had approached G.W. (later Sir George) Prothero46 to 
supervise the new outfit and its ‘production of some manuals relating to subjects that are likely 
to come before the Peace Congress’.47 Prothero was an inspired choice. A former Cambridge 
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fellow, who had taken a hand in reforming the historical tripos in the 1880s, he had occupied a 
chair at Edinburgh before succeeding his brother as editor of the Quarterly Review, that organ 
of the mildly conservative, educated classes of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain, ‘its 
principles ... [being] roughly those of Church and State’.48 Prothero was thus well connected in 
political and opinion-forming circles. He was an historians' historian whose earlier work 
reflected the growing professionalisation and specialisation of British historiography in this 
period. His first opus, a somewhat youthful a study of Simon de Montfort, was rooted in the 
Stubbsian tradition. Indeed, he followed in the bishop's footsteps with a collection of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean statutes, originally conceived as an aid for his Cambridge special 
subject and typical of the Victorians' commitment to the systematic gathering and categorising 
of knowledge.49 The outbreak of the war turned Prothero's career in a new direction. He became 
involved in propaganda activities, coordinating the literary efforts of the Central Committee of 
National Patriotic Organisations with the aim was of rebutting the intellectual merits of the 
German case: 'German apologists often maintain that that they are politically as free as we any 
people on earth, and that we are in no way superior to them in that respect. On the other hand it 
has been said ... by Englishmen, when asked to join the army, that they would be no worse off 
under the Kaiser than under King George.'50 The war also brought him belated public 
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recognition. He, too, cast off a number of war histories, the most significant of which was a 
study of pre-war German policy, an expanded lecture given to the Royal Historical Society in 
January 1915. In it he took the reader across now familiar terrain via the unholy trinity to a 
detailed consideration of Germany's precarious position in the centre of the continent. It was 
Germany's Drang nach Osten with the aim of '[t]he consequest of the Orient' that 'supplie[d] the 
master key to German foreign policy.' Domination of the Near East was, however, only one 
ambition. Once Germany had defeated France and Russia and established her mastery in Europe 
and the Near East, 'the final challenge might safely be issued to Great Britain for the empire of 
the world.'51 Prothero's writings were a typical case of scholarship in the service of propaganda. 
Indeed, using his many familial and professional connections he also advised on British press 
campaigns in the United States.52     
 As a Whitehall operator Prothero lacked the necessary guile and cunning to defend his 
own corner. There was continuous friction with his immediate superior, and there were run-ins 
with the India Office over demarcation disputes between its peace preparations and those 
undertaken by the Historical Section. Ultimately, Prothero's innate stubbornness and Hardinge's 
support helped him prevail. In early 1918, the transfer of his section to the Foreign Office as 
part of its Library establishment was complete, and the section's head was now free to 
concentrate on the production of his 'manuals'.53  
 Prothero acted as a kind of literary impresario, a role for which his nearly two decades at 
the helm of the Quarterly had predestined him. He drafted in a wide range of talent and experts, 
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drawing on his network of academic and other contacts.54 There was a genial, common room 
atmosphere in the offices in 3 Great College Street and later in the army hut in the middle of the 
now drained lake in St. James's Park, though at least one of Prothero's authors had to remind his 
fellow-toilers 'that they were not composing scholarly monographs at their leisure, but were 
compiling handbooks against time and for an ad hoc purpose.'55 They had, in fact, been 
instructed to aim for '[c]ompression and clearness ...; and the books must be severly practical.' 
Prothero encouraged his authors to 'draw such conclusions regarding the past as may seem ... 
fairly deducible from the facts referred to ..., and to make suggestions or recommendations 
concerning the future.'56 Between them, some eighty experts wrote 174 handbooks, generally 
known as peace books, or 'P. books', in the period between late 1917 and early 1919. All of 
them followed the same standard lay-out: geography, economy, ‘political history and present 
conditions’.57  
 The historians employed on the 'P. books', who are of particular interest for the purposes 
of this article, were recruited from two Whitehall sources, the newly created PID and MI2(e), 
the Historical Section of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Both, in fact, were headed by 
historians, the former by J.W. Headlam (since 1918 Headlam-Morley)58 and the latter by 
Temperley. Toynbee's apt comment about the PID as a sort of 'Ministry of All the Talents' 
applied equally to MI2(e). Both organisations were youthful, assertive and, most of all, 
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exceedingly well informed about far-away countries of which, as a rule, their political masters 
knew little.59 Among the writers obtained from Temperley's section were C.K. (later Sir 
Charles) Webster60 and E.L. (later Sir Llewellyn) Woodward.61 Webster had been a protégé of 
Temperley's at Cambridge, and both were close friends. They had begun to carve out a niche for 
themselves as specialists in diplomatic history in the last few years before 1914, Webster more 
especially as the leading expert on Castlereagh's foreign policy. A clutch of learned papers on it 
earned him a chair at Liverpool at the ridiculously young age of twenty-eight.62 In June 1915 he 
was gazetted as a 2nd Lieutenant, but his poor eyesight kept him confined to the Army Service 
Corps before being transferred to the War Office intelligence department in August 1917 by a 
'feat of wizardry ... performed by his friend and former teacher Harold Temperley.'63 Given his 
research specialism he was the natural choice as author of a manual on the Congress of Vienna. 
In its outline, it differed from the usual 'P. books', though its main emphasis was always on 
practicalities. Webster laid particular stress on the international circumstances during the two 
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years prior to the congress, before discussing in considerable detail the organisation of the 
congress and its proceedings. Although the 1815 settlement had shortcomings, its architects 
were focused on the 'possibilities of safeguarding the new Europe from aggression.' Crucially, 
in 'inventing the "Concert" they undoubtedly contributed in a very mark degree to the security of 
Europe.' It was a sotto voce demand for a new form of concert.64 
 Woodward's account of the 1878 Berlin Congress was a compendium of sorts to 
Webster's handbook, but his choice as author was more unusual. Four years Webster's junior, he 
had obtained a senior scholarship at St. John's College, Oxford, in 1913, though he had serious 
doubts about a career as a don. A student of the classics - he also had attended Zimmern's 
lectures in 1908-9 - he abandoned classical antiquity for more modern topics, and at the 
outbreak of the war he had begun a planned four-year project on the rise of Christianity in the 
later Roman Empire. He was something of a Francophile, who viewed German scholarship with 
distaste because of 'the political bias that has distorted nearly every word written by Germans 
about the first six centuries of the Christian era.'65 Having enlisted at the beginning of the war, 
he commanded an artillery battery at Loos, and was then employed in a minor intelligence role 
at Salonika before being invalided home in the summer of 1918. Thereafter he spent four 
months in Prothero's Historical Section. For his account of the Berlin Congress he was given 
access to the Foreign Office archives, but found that material insufficient, all the key papers 
having been squirrelled away by Disraeli and Lord Salisbury. His effort was nevertheless given 
'a good mark' by the Foreign Secretary, a pleasing acknowledgment 'since Balfour had attended 
the Congress as Salisbury's secretary.'66 
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 The impact of the 'P. books' on decision-making is difficult to gauge. Hardinge 
complimented Prothero on the handbooks, which had 'proved extremely valuable' and were 'a 
glowing testimony' to the work of the Historical Section.67 But their real value lay in 
establishing the nature of the problems likely to be settled at the peace conference rather than in 
producing blue prints for their solution. Indubitably, at Paris, they were used mostly by junior 
diplomats. Yet as one of them noted 'no more authoritative, comprehensive or lucid basis of 
information could possibly have been compiled.'68 The influence of Prothero's 'manuals', then, 
was more subtle and is to be found in the details of the 1919 peace settlements than in their 
grand design. Somewhat naively, Prothero himself had entertained hopes in that direction. A 
few days before the armistice, Balfour had invited him to attend the peace conference as 
Historical Adviser on account of his 'admirable work' so far.69 Yet he soon found that he had 
been ‘left out of all the Committees on which I might have served’; and on complaining of this, 
he found himself at the receiving end of a magisterial rebuke by Hardinge, who left him in no 
doubt that ‘there never was any intention that you should serve on any of the Commissions of 
the Conference. The designation of Historical Adviser in no way implies such duties.’70 Even if 
it had been, the 'Spanish influenza' left the septuagenarian Prothero hors de combat, and his spat 
with Hardinge was symptomatic of the decline of the Historical Section.71 Its work, as Prothero 
noted, was 'really done alr[ead]y, w[ith] v[er]y few except[ion]s, in the P. books.' During his 
brief sojourn at Paris, he himself had 'felt merely a fifth wheel to the coach', and the whole 
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experience had 'b[ee]n v[er]y inter[estin]g in var[iou]s ways, but on the whole a waste of time, 
& a disappointm[en]t, giv[in]g one a sub-sense of failure.'72    
 Less prominent but no less significant than Prothero's series were the 'Peace Papers' 
produced by MI2(e)73; and here, too, historians played a prominent role. If Woodward was a 
late-comer to military intelligence, his route there was typical - active service followed by 
reassignment on being invalided. Temperley, a fellow at Peterhouse since 1905, enlisted in 
September 1914 and, having escaped the maws of the Dardanelles, was redeployed in military 
intelligence when the War Office eventually realised his expertise - historical, geographical and 
linguistic - in matters Balkan. Indeed, he found time to write a history of Serbia during this 
time, a remarkably sympathetic account of the country and its people.74 Between October 1918 
and February 1919 he was on a mission to Serbia and the Southern Slav territories of the now 
imploded Habsburg Empire to assess conditions on the ground. He briefly joined the British 
delegation at Paris in April 1919 to assist in settling the protracted Italo-Serbian dispute over 
Fiume. Later still, he played an important part in establishing Albania's frontiers. Given his 
knowledge of South Eastern Europe, Temperley wrote several of the MI2(e) 'Peace Papers' on 
Albania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.75 
 Temperley was a Serbophile, and so was another historian in MI2(e), the Rev. 'Robin' 
Laffan.76 A Balliol-man with a first-class degree in modern history, he had served as an army 
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chaplain from the beginning of the war and between 1916 and 1918 had been with the British 
Salonika Force attached to the Serbian army. During the early months of 1917, he delivered a 
series of lectures on Serbian history, presumably for the edification of Tommy Atkins during a 
lull in the fighting. It was a wide-ranging, but essentially modern, post-1878 history of Serbia, a 
country he called 'one of the gateways of civilized Europe' that had never 'ceased to struggle 
against the barbarisms of Turkestan and Berlin.' The war had been brought about by 'the 
gamblers of the Central Empires'. Laffan was sympathetic to Serbia's 'Yugoslav' aspirations: 
'The mere restoration of Serbia at the close of the war ... would constitute a failure on the part of 
the Allies.’ Since the war had been thrust upon them, their object had to be to redraw the map of 
the region ‘to remove from Europe that most prolific source of trouble, divided nationalities.'77 
Such views inspired Laffan's intelligence memoranda on the frontiers of a future Yugoslav 
state.78 
 The section's Russian and Baltic specialist was Humphrey Sumner.79 His family 
background was a curious mixture of Barchester and Bloomsbury. Already at school he had 
learnt Russian, but war had interrupted his undergraduate studies and he spent three years in the 
King's Royal Rifle Corps, before being transferred to the military intelligence directorate at the 
War Office. He was the most prolific writer in MI2(e) with nearly half of the 'Peace Papers' to 
his name, invariably on subjects related to Russia and the peripheral parts of the Russian 
Empire that were now breaking away, areas such as Armenia, Finland and the Ukraine but also 
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on the Trentino and that curious relic of the Crimean war, the demilitarised status of the Åland 
Islands. As for the largest of the breakaway territories, he was certain ‘that eventually some 
form of tie with Great Russia will be recreated. The sooner this takes place the better, since the 
Great Russians will inevitably be impelled ... southwards to the Black Sea.’80 The focus of the 
reports by C.R. Cruttwell81, by contrast, was on Western Europe. A tutor at Hertford College, 
Oxford, with a background in the classics and modern history, he had enlisted in August 1914. 
Gazetted as - at the age of twenty seven - rather elderly 2nd Lieutenant in a Territorial Force 
battalion, 1/4 Berkshire Regiment, he been sent to Flanders and France.82 By 1916 declared 
unfit for general service and intermittently deployed as an instructor, he was eventually assigned 
to assist Temperley at the War Office in April 1918. In that role he produced reports on Alsace-
Lorraine and Belgium.83   
 Charles Webster had been in the intelligence directorate since 1917, and eventually 
became Temperley's right-hand man. His earlier intelligence studies focused on Germany and 
Central Europe, including a neo-Bismarckian critique of some of the Mitteleuropa ideas then 
current in Germany.84 When at the turn of 1917/18 various peace-feelers suggested a possible 
end to the war, Webster examined the possibility of an armistice, and also produced a detailed 
examination of the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.85 His contribution to the 
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'Peace Papers' was more limited. In fact, he produced only one such paper, on Zionism, in 
which he stressed ‘the connection of this ideal with the general aims of the Entente.’86 His pro-
Zionist sympathies, indeed, involved Webster in a row with the Foreign Office over its 'P. book' 
on the subject, which he condemned for its hostile bias and its many factual inaccuracies.87 
Webster was MI2(e)'s liaison officer with the PID. That he took up the matter testified as much 
to the strength of his sympathies for the cause of a Jewish state as to the strength of his relations 
with the Foreign Office. 
 In an interesting parallel with Prothero's Historical Section, MI2(e), now renamed 
MI6(b) began to decline once its 'Peace Papers' had been completed in early 1919. Webster, 
whose account of the Vienna Congress appeared in January 1919, was determined to leave the 
War Office once the peace conference had concluded its business.88 Sumner and Laffan wished 
to return to civilian life even sooner, and so did Cruttwell who had been offered a fellowship at 
his old college. Both of them, indeed, left in the second half of March 1919, with only a Captain 
Kennedy left as a 'general hack ... though he should not be consulted on any political 
questions'.89 Under the circumstances ‘the unit cannot continue its duties as heretofore’, 
Webster concluded, and recommended that it be wound down.90 He himself remained, serving 
as Assistant Secretary of the Military Section of the British delegation at the Paris conference, 
before requesting demobilisation on 14 July.91 
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 At the peace conference, as Webster later reflected, historians were 'as thick as bees'.92 
But he and Temperley apart, they were mostly from the PID. Its creation was an early exercise 
in the central coordination of political intelligence in Whitehall but, just as importantly, it was 
an essential part of Hardinge's bureaucratic power-grab, though its precise status and, more 
especially, the question of its permanency, remained unresolved at the moment of creation.93 
With one exception, the historians in it were Oxford-men, invariably from Balliol or New 
College, and usually with a strong background in the classics or mediaeval history. The 
exception was Headlam-Morley, the PID's assistant director and its 'doyen'.94 A Cambridge 
classicist - his first book, on Athenian politics, had won the Prince Consort Prize in 189095 - he 
eventually turned his attention to more contemporary themes with a biography of Bismarck. A 
fluent German-speaker - and with a German wife to boot - he also penned some twenty one 
articles on German and Austro-Hungarian topics for the tenth and eleventh editions of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.96 Following the outbreak of the war, he was attached to the 
propaganda department in Wellington House, during which time he produced an account of 
Europe's final crisis. Although reliant on official documents and eschewing any overt anti-
German bias, Headlam’s account was all the more effective for its restrained tone.97 Articles in 
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the Westminster Gazette and then, in 1917, a study of Germany policy on the eve of war 
followed, in effect a supplement to his earlier book, in which he sought to demonstrate that 
‘those who defeated the efforts in favour of peace that ... [the German chancellor] began at the 
eleventh hour’ were to be found ‘in Berlin’.98 Headlam-Morley's writings were strongly marked 
by his classical education and his pre-war civil service experience: 'He was considerate, 
enlightened, rational and commonsensical, averse from every extreme, from every fanaticism, 
from any emotional indulgence. Everything he wrote has the same high-minded and rather aloof 
quality.'99  
 Under Headlam-Morley's enlightened leadership, Toynbee and Zimmern found their 
niche in war-time intelligence. Amongst the other historians were Edwyn Bevan100 and Lewis 
Namier101. Bevan, a New College classicist, hailed from a banking family and had spent the 
years before 1914 pursuing his scholarly interests in Hellenism and, more especially, the 
intermingling of Greek ideas and ancient Judaism.102 An exact and meticulous scholar, rooted 
in firm Christian beliefs, he subscribed to the notion that the modern spirit of the Western world 
was 'really Hellenism reincarnate.'103 After a short time with the Artists' Rifles in 1914-15, he 
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joined Wellington House before being drafted into the PID. Amongst his war-time publications 
was a sketch of early civilisation in Mespotamia. Inspired by the 1916 military campaign there, 
its purpose was nevertheless historical, to show '[w]hat ... has Mesopotamia stood for in the 
past.'104  
 His other two books fell into the category of 'war histories'. The first of them was a study 
of German policy, provocatively called The Madness in the Method. It opened with an incisive 
examination of the German 'mind' before the war and then offered an account of the war aims 
discussion in Germany on the basis of newspapers and other publications. The origin of the war, 
Bevan concluded, was 'the temper of the German people in AD 1914 - the craving for vague 
splendid things, the unquestioning credulity with which they were ready to follow their rulers 
into a prodigious adventure.' On Germany's eventual defeat, there had to be a 'reasonable 
settlement' that would rest on the principle of 'justice and security'. The nationality principle, 
however, could not be 'applied rigidly' - Bevan was agnostic about an independent 
Czechoslovakia - but it 'could be applied to a much larger extent in the new settlement ... than 
... in the past.' Bevan supported the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine to France and of Germany 
losing her colonial possessions. But he warned that in seeking to annihilate German power, 'we 
may inflict upon Germany real injustice, and thus perpetuate Germany's evil will at an intensity 
which would constitute a permanent danger to us.' This was more especially a question of 
economics.105 Bevan followed this book up, in mid-1918, with a careful and diligent study of 
the German Social Democratic Party during the war, from its initial support for the imperial 
government in August 1914 to the growing rift within the movement and its eventual split into 
                                                      
and Sceptics: Four Lectures delivered in Oxford during Hilary Term 1913 for the Common University Fund 
(Oxford, 1913).  
104.E. Bevan, The Land of the Two Rivers (London, 1917), v. The book is a sketch of Near Eastern history, broadly 
defined in cultural terms, from c. 1000 BC to the time of the Arab conquest. 
105.E. Bevan, The Madness in the Method: A Fresh Consideration of the Case between Germany and Ourselves 
(London, 1917), 57, 287, 289 and 292. Parts of the book had appeared in The Times Literary Supplement, 4 Nov. 
1915, and in two articles in The Nineteenth Century in Sept. and Dec. 1916.  
  
 
  29 
two rival parties. Based on whatever materials could be procured from Germany, he sought to 
demonstrate that the chasm between the two was fundamental and ideological at the leadership 
level, and that it was difficult to see how unity could be restored. He also warned that the break-
away faction grew 'not because the German masses cared for "self-determination of 
nationalities" or "no annexations" ..., but because bereavements and material discomforts of the 
war made them want peace above everything else.' The same masses had acquiesced in 
Germany's control of the East after Brest-Litovsk and they would do so again, '[i]f the German 
military machine were to secure a similar peace on [sic] the West.'106 
 Bevan's Madness in the Method owed a good deal to his friend Namier, the most 
unusual member of the PID and, perhaps, also the most complex personality. A Jew and not a 
Jew, a Pole and yet often virulently Polonophobe, the son of a Galician landowner who craved 
the security of landed wealth and yet was powerfully attracted to socialism and sympathetic to 
the Ruthenian peasantry, Namier was a square peg in too many holes. The LSE had given him a 
taste for social problems, Balliol had turned his mind towards history. He was naturalised a 
British subject in 1913, and on the outbreak of war he enlisted, somewhat quixotically, in the 
Public Schools battalion, but was discharged owing to his poor eyesight in 1915, to be rescued 
by an Oxford contemporary, Lord Eustace Percy, and despatched to Wellington House where he 
was employed to compile précis of the Austrian press.107 In the same year he also published 
Germany and Eastern Europe, in which he argued that the root cause of the war was the 
struggle between Germany and Russia for domination of Eastern Europe. Germany's leaders 
had 'inherited [Bismarck's] brutality without any of his shrewdness', and so embarked on a 
preventive war before Russia '[i]n five years' time, if ... left to complete her armaments ... 
[became] superior to the joint forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary.' The Habsburg lands 
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were a forward base for Germany to facilitate her expansion into the Balkans and Turkey, and 
this made a clash with Russia inevitable. Britain had entered the war 'over West-European 
questions and we want to see them settled in a ... just and reasonable [way].' But the true origins 
of the conflict lay in the suppression of nationalities and imperial rivalries in the East. Austria-
Hungary was a failed state, Namier averred. The Dual Monarchy's very existence whetted 
German imperialist designs. It was 'a channel for German influence and a support of German 
dominion in Eastern Europe' and it 'must therefore cease to exist.' Europe had to be reordered 'in 
accordance with nationality', which left open to possibility of some form of Austro-German 
Anschluss: 'But German influence has to be limited to German land.' However, unless Austria-
Hungary was 'dismembered "root and branch" many wars will still have to be fought before we 
arrive at a stable settlement in that part of the world.'108 
 An historian, whose services could not be procured for the PID was Seton-Watson, even 
though many of its members had connections to his journal. He remained on the fringes of 
official policy, but was to prove useful during the hiatus between the collapse of the central 
powers and the peace conference.109 PID activities during 1918 consisted chiefly in collating 
and analysing political intelligence and drawing up background memoranda to assist in the 
preparations for an eventual peace conference. The analytical depth and qualitative breadth of 
the material produced by PID swiftly won it the plaudits of senior diplomats: 'It was not long 
before their influence permeated to the executive departments on the floors below.'110 That 
influence, however, was by no means all-pervasive. Given their support for the idea of a Europe 
reordered along national lines, most PID members took a relaxed view of a union between the 
German-Austrian Republic and Germany: 'We cannot exterminate the Austrian Germans; we 
cannot make them cease to feel German. They are bound to be somewhere. ... [E]nforced 
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separation would merely stimulate German nationalism, but would not prevent cooperation 
between the two branches nor their final reunion.'111 Bevan, too, urged to recognise ‘that the 
people now dominant in the country [Germany] have quite different ideals of political life and 
international action from those of the old régime. ... [I]f we fail to realize this ... we shall miss 
the opportunities of the hour.’112 At the Paris conference such pragmatism failed to overcome 
French recalcitrance and American lack of interest.  
 That same mixture of principle and pragmatism characterised the recommendations of 
the PID elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe. Given the strong links with T.G. Masaryk and 
other Czech leaders, support for a Czechoslovak aspirations was well nigh universal. Seton-
Watson stated an obvious truth when he noted that 'Austria-Hungary has ceased to exist'. The 
corollary to this, the 'only logical principle' on which the Allies could now deal 'with the former 
Dual Monarchy', was the formal recognition of the now emerging successor states.113 Strategic 
considerations dictated that support for the nationality principle be tempered in the case of the 
German-Bohemian majority in the Czech lands. Several PID members emphasised the 
geopolitical significance of the Bohemian basin, though Namier acknowledged that 'the 
inclusion of a large German minority in districts contiguous on German territory is extremely 
inconvenient, if not downright dangerous, to the Czechs.'114 Whether or not minority rights 
were laid down ‘on broad & general lines’, the position of ethnic Germans and Magyars in the 
new state was likely to be a source of postwar instability.115 No-one harboured any doubts about 
the tensions inherent in the Central European settlement which imposed ethnically defined 
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borders on the vanquished Habsburg successor states but conferred strategic frontiers on those 
who who wound up on the side of the Entente. ‘[T]here is really no defence possible’ of the 
Bohemian borders, Headlam-Morley reflected afterwards.116 Nevertheless, in geopolitical 
terms, as Zimmern stressed, ‘Czecho-Slovakia is the natural pivot’.117  
 The post-Napoleonic period remained a frequent point of reference in PID thinking. On 
reviewing the internal situation in Russia, for instance, Headlam-Morley warned of the 'very 
serious danger that at any rate in appearance a permanent union of civilised states might appear 
to become a Holy Alliance against Socialism.' However 'perverted' Bolshevism might be, it was 
rooted in Marxist ideas; and '[h]owever pernicious the doctrines of Marxism may be, it is a 
disastrous thing to have an international alliance against an idea.'118 The warning went 
unheeded, though it was acute. Headlam-Morley was more successful in brokering a 
compromise over Danzig. It was a matter ‘not ... merely of German sentiment but of principle’ 
that that port city not be handed ‘to an alien Power’. Instead he suggested the creation of a 
'semi-independent city-state', which proved the decisive break-through in the search for a 
settlement of the Polish question.119 Although the PID and its experts had demonstrated their 
worth, the department did not survive the peace conference for long. With its status left open in 
1918, it proved the exception to the otherwise sage French proverb about 'le provisoire qui 
dure'. Most of its members drifted back into civilian life soon after the proceedings at Paris 
were wound down. Postwar fiscal retrenchment, moreover, left it exposed to the 'Geddes Axe'. 
It had, perhaps, never been 'wholeheartedly accepted' by the rest of the Foreign Office. It 
housed, as E.H. Carr, then a career diplomat briefly affiliated with the PID, reflected later, 'too 
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many eccentrics'.120  And with Hardinge relinquishing Whitehall for the Paris embassy their fate 
was sealed.  
 
*** 
The PID and MI2(e) nevertheless left an imprint both on Whitehall and on the historical 
profession. In 1923 Webster noted that during the war 'the Historian was associated increasingly 
with the practical conduct of affairs, as the area of conflict broadened, and the men of action 
were confronted with new and startling emergencies.'121 The war emergency had forced the 
British government to compensate for its lack of analytical power by recruiting scholars into the 
war machinery. In that sense, the various intelligence outfits, staffed by historians, were a first 
attempt at a more holistic approach to policy-making that drew on, and sought to integrate, a 
wider range of sources of information. Headlam-Morley's services were retained. He succeeded 
Prothero as Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. In that role he continued to write 
background memoranda from an historical perspective. Dispassionate and first-rate, they were, 
in essence, departmental minutes rather than works of history.122 Headlam-Morley's role is, 
perhaps, best understood as that of a 'knowledge manager', whose wide network of academic 
and official contacts placed him at the heart of various scholarly and public policy projects in 
the 1920s, not least that of publishing the British documents on the origins of the war.123   
 Although the wartime intelligence departments were dismantled, the experiment was 
deemed to have made a significant contribution to the war effort so that it was revived on the 
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outbreak of the next world war, albeit within certain confines, as Woodward noted wistfully:  
 
It is a queer thing that, in the last war when we were young, we saw the ablest 
and best of our contemporaries killed as junior officers when they should have 
been singled out for high military responsibilities, and, in this war, when we 
have behind us years of experience, and of the exercise of judgment and 
authority, we cannot get into the key positions controlling policy and executive 
action within the sphere of our special competence.124   
 
 Perhaps, like Prothero in 1919, Woodward had succumbed to the delusions of grandeur. 
Even so, the experience of war-time governmental employment clearly sharpened historians' 
sense of the realities of international politics and it affected the manner in which they studied 
and wrote about the past. Both these developments were visible in the creation, on the fringes of 
the peace conference in May 1919, of the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs. 
From the beginning it was intended to devote some of its resources to promoting the study of 
contemporary history with a policy-related purpose. At that inaugural meeting it was also 
decided to produce a multi-volume compendium on the peace conference, the editorship of 
which was entrusted to Temperley, who had earned his first editorial spurs as A.W. Ward's 
amanuensis on the Cambridge Modern History.125 It was a pioneering project, for no 
comparable work on a contemporary subject had ever been undertaken before. It was instructive 
also in another respect. For in inventing contemporary history, it merely poured the old Whig 
wine into new skins, painted in League colours. Temperley left the contributors in no doubt that 
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the time for Actonian neutrality had passed: 'Such impartiality, if possible in the past, is 
impossible in the present. But contributors should aim at the international point of view and 
regard the Conference not from Washington or London but from Geneva - where for the first 
time in world history a permanent world organization will be established.'126 This was the old 
Whig history of the ever more perfect unfolding of the British constitution transposed into the 
international sphere. 1919 and the League carried on the work of the Congress of Vienna. 
Webster certainly thought so: '[T]he experience of 1815-22 demonstrates clearly ... that an 
association which depends merely on personal connections of one or two men is doomed from 
the outset. The inevitable reaction against their personalities would be in itself sufficient to 
destroy any chances of success. And now it is possible to go further.'127 Temperley struck the 
same chord. The old ‘balance of power’ politics had played out. The ‘weak point of the idea’ 
was always its ad hoc nature: ‘Each power is the judge in its own cause, and no one knows how 
& when it will decide. Hence no concerted plan.’ The League was the logical answer to this, 
‘[f]or the League implies definite texts - limitation of armaments, territorial guarantees, 
prohibition of war.’ Temperley was by no means blind to the failings of the post-war settlement, 
but remained convinced that the League provided the only viable international mechanism: 
‘One thing is certain, … there is no remedy for the ills of the world if the League does not 
succeed.’ In that event, ‘war will come again & a more terrible & devastating war than we can 
imagine. It can only be averted by a res[olu]te resort to the ways of peace, and for that the only 
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instrument is the League.’128  
 For many of the 1919 generation Paris confirmed their conversion to the creed of 
Geneva. Temperley and Webster, the latter very active in the League of Nations Union during 
the 1920s and 1930s, were only two of them.129 Zimmern turned from ancient history to the 
nascent discipline of international relations as the inaugural Woodrow Wilson professor at 
Aberystwyth before taking the Montague Burton chair at Oxford. 'International Organisation' 
was one of the great forces borne out of war, he expounded, and it was 'a material force' that 
derived its motive power 'from conditions in the external world.'130 Invariably, the spirit of 
Geneva weakened as the 1930s hove into view, and Zimmern's idealism was tempered now 
with weariness: 'Our choice is between attempting to civilize the barbarian [economic forces 
and nationalism] and abandoning our city: between internationalism or monasticism: between 
an effort at Hellenization ... or acquiescence in catastrophe and a return to the Dark Ages.'131 
Still committed to the ideals of collective security, he thought that the Manchurian crisis had 
left the League 'revealed as a free masonry of the Great Powers'.132 His wartime work had also 
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sharpened Zimmern's appreciation of the public responsibility of experts, though he remained 
true to his Hellenist roots in conceiving of the expert as a quasi-Platonic philosopher—
consigliere to the new kings of democracy.133 Such ideas were at the root of his pioneering 
initiatives in the field of international education and intellectual cooperation, which contributed 
to the creation of UNESCO, whose first director Zimmern became in 1946.134 
 Toynbee's intellectual development, after a brief and unhappy interlude as the first 
Koraes professor at King's College London, went in a similar direction. As research director at 
Chatham House, a position to which Headlam-Morley had helped when he sought escape from 
feuding Greeks in London, he fostered the study of contemporary affairs with his Annual 
Surveys; and here his wartime experience alerted him to the pitfalls of the enterprise: 'To give 
people the benefit of any doubt is particularly advisable for historian when the history with 
which he is dealing is very recent, because the nature of his evidence makes it impossible for 
conclusions to be more than tentative.'135 In later years, he dismissed his wartime writings as 
'juvenalia'; and yet in Nationality and the War there are buried the seeds of some of his later 
arguments about the cyclical rise and fall of cultures in his monumental Study of History: 
'Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms - Growth and Decay'.136 
 As for those who returned from Whitehall and Paris to history proper, it has sometimes 
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been suggested that the war created diplomatic history.137 Such blanket judgment requires some 
refinement and qualification. Temperley and Webster had embarked upon research in 
diplomatic history before 1914, and indeed had developed ambitious plans for a multi-volume 
study of British foreign policy.138 After 1919 Temperley and Webster returned to the fields they 
had left five years earlier, but they did not simply continue ploughing the furrows they had left 
in 1914. War had impressed upon them the importance of decision-making processes as well as 
external forces, especially also now geography. In his inaugural lecture, Temperley suggested 
that 'by limiting aims, by increasing objectivity, and by abandoning vain speculation' historians 
could advance knowledge and understanding of the past.139 This was a kind of 'technical 
history', later half-praised and half-derided by his pupil Herbert Butterfield, that favoured 
specialisation and the detailed study of diplomatic documents. Temperley's study of Canning's 
foreign policy, a far cry from his youthful earlier monograph, was testament to this new 
approach. It also testified to the formative experience of war: 'Practical experience of war and 
diplomacy during the years 1914-21 has taught much that no historian could acquire by mere 
diligence. ... [I]ncreased knowledge of the practice of diplomacy makes one recognise the great 
difficulties which always beset the practical man, and the much greater difficulties which 
always beset the historian who has to pass judgment upon him.'140 Webster, who produced two 
major tomes on Castlereagh in the decade after the war as well as several important papers on 
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nineteenth-century diplomacy, followed similar precepts. 'The Foreign Office papers are one 
whole'; and the study of British foreign policy required immersion in a wide range of country 
files and personal papers. This was a matter of technique. Equally important was an 
appreciation of the wider systemic context of international politics. In sharp contrast to his two 
papers on Castlereagh before 1914, which focused entirely on the deeds of the man, the first 
120 pages of Webster's monograph were devoted to the domestic context and institutional 
apparatus within which his subject operated, followed by a detailed sketch of international 
setting.141 
 Seton-Watson, who became the inaugural T.G. Masaryk chair at the newly created 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, remained involved in the affairs of Eastern 
Central and South East European affairs. But he also turned his attention to nineteenth-century 
diplomatic history, for which he utilised the Imperial Russian embassy archives, held in London 
until their return to the Soviet authorities in 1925. His monograph on the 'Great Eastern Crisis' 
was a 'technical' history in the Temperley sense, but it was more than that. It contained an 
ideological core, presenting Disraeli as an exponent of that muddling and misguided 'old 
diplomacy' that ran aground in 1914 and Gladstone as a forerunner of Geneva-style 
internationalism.142 Seton-Watson attempt at a survey of British policy towards the continent 
during the long nineteenth century was perhaps strong on analysis and ideological drive than 
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technical competence, a defect he himself admitted. He accepted Britain's 'hybrid position', half-
in and  half-out of Europe, but swept aside as impractical the facile distinction between 
'intervention' and 'non-intervention' that for so long bedevilled discussions of foreign policy. 
The interests of post-war Britain, he concluded, were 'more worldwide than ever before, and her 
need for peace is correspondingly greater.' The lesson of the past, then, was that Britain ought to 
be ready to collaborate with any country, 'but not at the expense of her own free institutions, and 
only on the basis of international peace and cooperation.'143 If this left the door open to 
'appeasement', he took a forceful anti-Chamberlain position in two further books on current 
affairs.144  
 In the cases of some wartime intelligence officials, the war really did turn them into 
diplomatic historians. Davis, who returned to Oxford in 1919, abandoned the Middle Ages for 
the nineteenth century. With his 1926 Raleigh lecture before the British Academy he ventured 
into historiographical terra incognita, Anglo-Russian competition for control of Central Asia in 
the first half of the century.145 Sumner, the most prolific of writers in MI2(e), proved to be a 
slow writer once ensconced again in the cloisters of academe. He contributed to Temperley's 
history of the peace conference and was closely involved with Chatham House, but it took him 
until 1937 before he published his first major work, a study of Russian policy in the Balkans in 
the 1870s. Based on a mass of mostly published sources in many languages, it was a masterly 
exercise in that kind of 'technical' history that Temperley had stipulated, mindful of external and 
internal contexts and of the constraints on decision-makers that arose out of the actions of 
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others as much as out of geopolitical factors.146 These were central to his survey of Russian 
history and his two slim studies of Peter the Great.147 E.L. Woodward's turn towards 
international history was similarly slow, though he, too, was involved in Chatham House. His 
earlier interest in religious matter had not faded altogether, but it was the rise of Hitler's 
Germany that made him turn his attention to the pre-1914 Anglo-German naval race, the 
resulting monograph, 'no politician has ever read', he noted wryly in his memoirs.148 It was a 
major tour de force of 'technical' history, meticulous and comprehensive, but largely confined to 
official sources. From 1944 onwards, Woodward was editor of the British diplomatic document 
series for the interwar years, and also wrote a five-volume history of British foreign policy 
during the Second World War. Originally written between 1942 and 1950 for official use only, 
it was a work of detail but without much hindsight.149  
 In his study of the First World War, Woodward praised C.R. Cruttwell's monograph on 
the subject as 'the most profound study of any war in modern times.'150 Its author is now 
remembered mostly because of Evelyn Waugh's juvenile vendetta against him which may have 
contributed to his mental decline - and perhaps because of his uncanny resemblance to Oliver 
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Hardy. To some degree Cruttwell's study was of its time, monumental and painstaking, its vivid 
literary style often laced with sometimes crude national stereotypes. Yet it was also analytical in 
its attention to structural and procedural aspects of decision-making as well as calculations of 
grand strategy. Above all, it raised fundamental questions about the escalating nature of war: 
‘The events of 1914-1918 have proved that war between great states ... cannot now be regarded 
as “an instrument of policy”. It becomes inevitably a struggle for existence.’151 Considerations 
of geographical factors and political relevance of the studying the past were central to 
Cruttwell's thinking. His last major work, initiated by Toynbee as literary director at Chatham 
House and published in 1937, indeed, was a study of the mechanisms of post-war international 
politics within the broader sweep of the rise of international organisation since the nineteenth 
century. As the sun was setting on the Geneva experiment, it was a late plea for the importance 
an organisation 'which contains the promise of being converted into an instrument of 
international conciliation and revision more permanent, more impartial, and more universal than 
the old Concert of Europe.'152  
 The last of the historians examined here had no such illusions. Lewis Namier was a 
realist, and took a grim pleasure in his withering contempt for the League and even more so for 
Anglo-saxon delusions about it. Although he lent his name to a style of history that was detailed 
and static, he was - rather like Karl Marx - 'ne ... pas namieriste'.153 His tragedy - one of many - 
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was, perhaps, that he was a far better analyst of international politics than of the Westminster 
manoeuvres of eighteenth-century backwoodsmen. 
 
*** 
The historians examined here would be horrified to discover that that they had anything in 
common, that they had a uniform outlook on account of joint experiences, or - worse of all - 
that were part of some 'school'. And yet, just as they brought their scholarly skills and abilities 
to bear on their wartime work, so the experience of war and government affected the trajectory 
of their scholarly pursuits after 1919. The war did not create diplomatic history. But the war 
gave it a deeper meaning and firmer and more rigorous contours. The light of history shone in 
both directions. 
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